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Abstract—Natural resource conflicts have resulted in attempts at
better collaboration between public and private sectors. The result-
ing partnerships approach collaboration either by problem solving
through better information and management, or by requiring sub-
stantial social change. The Applegate Partnership in Oregon and
the Grand Canyon Forest Partnership in Arizona illustrate each
approach. These approaches show the formative influences that
shape the evolution and activities of a partnership, and show the
need for multistakeholder participation.
Introduction ____________________
Over the past decade, numerous communities, agencies,
and interest groups in the American West have turned to
collaboration to manage natural resource conflict and de-
velop and implement plans for managing, preserving, and
restoring the landscape. These collaborations take many
different forms because they emerge in response to local
political, economic, and ecological circumstances. Yet all
must respond to a common challenges: complex problems,
diverse and often conflicting interests, fluid and often shift-
ing relationships of power and authority, and the need to
develop local capacity and resources.
These collaborative initiatives, often referred to as “part-
nerships,” have attracted increasing attention as communi-
ties, agencies, and interest groups create, join, or actively
resist these multistakeholder initiatives. A growing body of
literature has attempted to comprehend and characterize
these groups (Brick and others 2000; Cestero 1999; Conley
2000; Kenny 1999, 2000; Moore and Koontz 2000; Moseley
1999; Sturtevant and Lange 1995; Weber and Herzog 2000).
Our assertion is that many of the efforts to explain partner-
ships and collaboratives overlook a fundamental distinction
among groups that explains variations in group character,
configuration, focus, and success.
We argue that a partnership chooses between at least two
fundamentally different ways of seeing and defining its
problem. One approach views the challenge as a quasi-
technical problem requiring better information, technical
expertise, organizational efficiency, and public education.
The other views the situation as requiring substantial social
change—the reorganization and redistribution of the
decisionmaking authority, responsibility, and resources,
and the allocation of costs and benefits associated with land
management/stewardship.
We draw on two partnership initiatives—the Applegate
Partnership of southwestern Oregon, and the Grand Canyon
Forest Partnership of northern Arizona—to illustrate this
distinction. Using these two groups, we further suggest that
a group’s choice between these two orientations depends on
the characteristics of the founding group—those who initiate
the partnership, define the problem to be addressed, and
recruit the rest of the participants. We assert that the dispo-
sition of this founder group will largely determine a group’s
choice of strategies. Therefore, it is essential to understand
what factors determine who assumes the founding role,
shaping both the partnership, its perception of the problem,
and the strategies it will create to address that problem.
Method ________________________
In this paper, we compare the Applegate Partnership in
southwestern Oregon and the Grand Canyon Forest Part-
nership in northern Arizona. The Applegate Partnership
came together in 1992 to address forest conflict and create
ecosystem-based management in the Applegate Watershed.
Founders created the Grand Canyon Forest Partnership in
1996 to reach agreement about how to reduce fire hazard and
restore the forests surrounding the City of Flagstaff. The
Grand Canyon Forest Partnership and the Applegate Part-
nership offer fertile grounds for comparison, in part, because
they share similar ecological challenges and yet developed
markedly different forms to address them. Both the Applegate
Valley and northern Arizona are naturally fire-dominated
ecosystems with the federal land management agencies
controlling a large percentage of the land. In both regions,
extensive timber extraction, grazing, and fire suppression
had led to dense stands of small trees. Many participants in
both groups were worried that these forest conditions would
lead to large-scale, disruptive change especially wildfire,
species loss, and habitat degradation.
The material for this paper is drawn from the authors’
participant observation in these two groups. Brett KenCairn
was a founding Applegate Board member and was active
with the Partnership from 1992 to 1997. KenCairn was
involved in the Grand Canyon Forest Partnership in 1998
and 1999. Cassandra Moseley was a board member of the
Applegate Partnership and also conducted extensive inter-
views and participant observation in the Applegate Valley
between 1995 and 1998.
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Formative Influence of
Local Context __________________
Kingdon (1984) argues that political change occurs when
a “window of opportunity” opens that creates the political
space for a new policy or idea to be introduced into politics
(see also Moseley 1999). These windows open for a variety of
reasons, ranging from regular events such as elections to
extraordinary political crises. In both of our case studies,
political crises created the opportunity to realign institu-
tional arrangements. In the Applegate, the injunction that
halted timber harvest in the territory of the northern spot-
ted owl created the window of opportunity. The anger and
administrative chaos that the injunction created allowed a
community leader to pull together people to talk about new
forms of land management.
In northern Arizona, disputes over federal forest man-
agement coupled with dramatic wildfires that threatened
Flagstaff created a sense of crisis. This crisis pushed
natural resource agencies, elected officials, and other com-
munity leaders to search for common ground that would
allow federal managers to implement new forms of forest
management.
Despite similarities of political crises, the partnerships
that emerged were markedly different. In Flagstaff, the
institutional dynamics of participant agencies dominated
the Partnership. In the Applegate, a hybrid community/
institution-based group emerged that eventually evolved
into a community-based group.
Participant Worldview and Perceptions of
“the Problem”
The Grand Canyon Forest Partnership (GCFP) was founded
as a collaboration of government agencies and nongovern-
mental organizations to reduce fire hazard and improve forest
health on the 100,000 acres of public lands surrounding
Flagstaff. GCFP founders believed that legal and political
conflict and disagreement over federal forest management
were preventing the formulation and support for a new
approach to active forest management. Participant groups
were selected based on their technical expertise or their role
as opinion leaders in the region. Partnership founders be-
lieved that they could get the public to trust their efforts if they
recruited a diverse collection of leading organizations to
support the work of forest restoration specialists. The group
focused on convening experts to develop a solution and creat-
ing public support for the proposed solution.
When faced with a similar if more extreme political crisis,
Applegate leaders founded a very different partnership. The
Applegate Partnership founders wanted to develop a com-
prehensive management strategy at a watershed (500,000
acre) scale. New management strategies would be “ecologi-
cally sound, economically viable, and socially acceptable.”
(Unattributed quotes come from anonymous interviews of
Applegate Partnership participants.)  At the outset, Apple-
gate leaders choose to address the ecological problems they
faced at a larger scale—ecologically and socially—than the
effort in Flagstaff. But more importantly, Applegate leaders
viewed the central causes of the problem they faced—and
how they could be best addressed—in a much different way.
The Applegate founders believed that the model in which
government agencies developed plans and then put them out
for public review was not working. This process left out too
many people until it was too late in the process, which
created a narrow problem definition, and offered too few
sources of ideas for solving complex problems. Applegate
leaders saw problems as being so complex that no one person
or set of people with particular perspectives or interests
could hope to solve them.
Why were these groups so different and what have been
the effects? We argue that the difference in group form and
problem definition was caused by the different political
context, especially institutional arrangements. These differ-
ent visions affected partnership organization, accomplish-
ments, and how the groups responded to outside challenges.
Political Context and Locus of Authority
Although Kingdon (1984) points us toward political crisis
as an opportunity for change, he offers us little guidance for
understanding which ideas and changes will flow through
the window and who will push them. Historical institution-
alists encourage us to look at institutional form and “thick-
ness” to understand what shapes change (sensu Skowronek
1997). Skocpol (1979), Orren and Skowronek (1998 to 1999),
and Skowronek (1982) argue that past institutional develop-
ment will shape the form of change in the present and future.
Following their lead, we argue that, although there is no
guarantee that partnership groups will choose social change
over pragmatism, this is more likely to occur when private
citizens are able to play a major role in the group’s founding
and problem definition than when leadership is primarily
representatives of pre-existing institutions, especially gov-
ernment agencies.
The Grand Canyon Forest Partnership came together in
an institutionally thick environment. Flagstaff and its sur-
rounding forests were at the center of the jurisdictional
interests of numerous elected officials, local, and state gov-
ernment agencies. Flagstaff is the county seat of Coconino
County and hosts most of the county government and ser-
vices. It is also the location of the Coconino National Forest
Supervisor’s Office and two of the four Ranger District
offices. Flagstaff maintains a full-time wildfire specialist
and coordinates multiagency wildfire responses. Flagstaff is
also an administrative center for a variety of other organiza-
tions that were to become important members of the Grand
Canyon Forest Partnership including Arizona Game and
Fish, the Arizona State Land Department, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, and the Nature Conservancy. In addition,
several regional environmental groups and chapters of na-
tional groups are headquartered in Flagstaff including the
Grand Canyon Trust, the Sierra Club, and the Southwest
Forest Alliance (a consortium of more than 90 environmen-
tal advocacy groups).
The consequence of this institutional thickness was the
dominance of institutions in the formation of this collabora-
tive. The thickness privileged institutional representatives
over private citizens. This difference between citizens and
institutional representatives matters because of the ways
that these representatives are tied to their institutional
mandates and cultures. Our argument is not that citizen
innovation was impossible but rather that it is difficult and
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unlikely in these circumstances without extraordinary en-
ergy on the part of citizens.
In Flagstaff, leadership from government agencies did not
divorce itself from their organizational perspective. Conse-
quently, rather than seeking social change, the leadership
sought to solve technical problems. What happened in Flag-
staff reflects more generally what we might expect in an
environment thick with bureaucratic institutions. People
working in particular organizations bring with them the
mandates of these agencies and are seeking to solve the
problems they face.
This tendency is heightened because many natural re-
source agencies were formed with Progressive Era ideology
in which problems were seen as primarily technical and
experts were the best qualified to solve those problems (Hays
1959, 1991; Hirt 1994; Kaufman 1960; Moseley 1999; Tho-
mas 1999; Luker 1984; Ross 1991). Technically trained
experts could manage resources efficiently for the greater
common good (Pinchot 1990). Through the application of
scientific principles, nature could be simplified and ordered
to bring it under human control (Scott 1998). By implication,
citizens were either too self-interested or too ignorant to
participate. Even when people in natural resource agencies
take a broader view, formal and informal institutional pro-
cesses have already been shaped using a Progressive Era
model. Thus when faced with a crisis, or a failure of the old
order, these agencies seek change but still find themselves
tied to older institutional processes (Moseley 1999; Orren
and Skowronek 1998–1999; Skocpol 1979; Skowronek 1982).
Exceptional leadership, complete breakdown of normal in-
stitutional politics, or intensive outside pressure, we argue,
would be required to shift these politics.
The jurisdictional conditions and social development could
not have been more different in the Applegate Valley. There
are no incorporated communities in the Valley and, thus, no
city government. A county line divides the Valley in half, and
thus no county-level elected officials see the Valley as their
territory. No state or local agencies locate their offices in the
Valley. The major exceptions to this are the federal land
management agencies. The Forest Service has a Ranger
Station in the Valley and major portions of two BLM re-
source areas are located in the Applegate Valley. With the
exception of the Applegate Ranger District, all government
offices are 30 to 45 minutes away.
In addition to the relatively weak organizational bases of
local and state government, few staffed nongovernmental
organizations focused on the Applegate. Headwaters, the
longest standing regional environmental organization in
southern Oregon, was active in the Applegate but was
housed in Ashland, a town outside the Applegate. Similarly,
the Sierra Club and other national organizations had active
members living in the Applegate but local chapters were
located in towns outside the Valley and were servicing an
area several times the size of the Applegate.
Instead of thick formal bureaucratic and political institu-
tions, the Applegate Valley had a long history of small-scale
social and political organizations (Moseley 1999; Preister
1993; Sturtevant and Lange 1995). Particularly important
for natural resources were a number of small-scale, volun-
teer environmental groups that had monitored federal tim-
ber sales during the 1970s and 1980s. They opposed federal
actions by mobilizing networks of residents to attend public
hearings, write letters, and submit appeals. These small,
volunteer groups developed a cadre of community residents
who understood the basics of forest management and Forest
Service and BLM administration.
These community residents, moreover, were not stereo-
typical rural community residents but rather people who
had moved to rural areas in the 1970s and 1980s to escape
traditional suburban life. (For a description of “back-to-the-
landers” see Jacob [1997].)  Social change had long been a
part of their personal ideology. Several of the core group of
Applegate Partnership founders had long been acting upon
their personal social change agendas by protesting federal
timber sales. Through these protests they came to see the
limits of old political processes and developed ideas for
alternative approaches to citizen involvement.
Instead of numerous government agencies and sophisti-
cated nongovernmental organizations facing the limits of
old management strategies first, it was community resi-
dents and the federal land management agencies. Instead of
placing leadership from formal organizations at the center of
change, the jurisdictional paucity in the Applegate put
community residents at the center. With the Forest Service
and the BLM in crisis, it was community residents who
stepped forward to create change.
Core Group Formation and Participant
Recruitment
In these different institutional climates, the initial lead-
ers drew upon different networks to identify and recruit
initial participants. In the institutionally rich environment
of northern Arizona, organizers used formal networks of
existing institutions and agencies to identify representa-
tives. In the Applegate, organizers frequently turned to the
informal network of community residents to recruit indi-
viduals known.
In the Applegate, Jack Shipley, the organizer of the
initiative, was a private citizen. Shipley had a long history
as an environmental activist. He was part of a network of
citizen activists and knew many government officials and
other professional and technical specialists. Shipley and his
early allies broadened these networks driven by the belief
that only with broad participation could a collaboration find
solutions. Long before Jack Shipley decided to hold a found-
ing meeting, he undertook several months of shuttle diplo-
macy between various interest groups, neighborhood groups,
and people in the Applegate and larger Rogue Basin. Shipley’s
strategy was an organizing campaign—similar to tradi-
tional union organizing—not an information campaign. He
put forward provisional ideas and sought suggestions.
He was not offering a solution but an opportunity for people
to participate in figuring out a solution. Driven by an idea of
social change that pushed experts out of the center of
decisionmaking and created broad participation, Shipley
believed that he had to recruit people from a wide variety of
perspectives. This choice was motivated not simply by politi-
cal considerations, but by the core belief that only with this
wide variety of perspectives participating could innovative
solutions be found.
The founding leaders understood, however implicitly,
that their central problem was to move people out of their
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traditional boxes as “industry,” “enviros,” or agency.” If
people could open up to other perspectives then, leaders
hoped, the group could find solutions that no one could
develop independently.
In contrast to the Applegate, where a private citizen
working largely independent of any organizational affilia-
tion created the partnership, a frustrated Forest Service
official stymied by public opposition to traditional manage-
ment approaches founded the Grand Canyon Forest Part-
nership. In the early 1990s, Fred Trevey, then Supervisor of
the Coconino National Forest, watched litigation and public
opinion prevent the Forest Service from implementing fa-
miliar forest management. Recognizing that implementing
forest management required a new base of public support,
Trevey began convening informal meetings with a small
circle of local environmental leaders, academics, and city
and county government personnel. The group decided to
form an institutional partnership to develop a consensus for
restoration-based forest management.
This initial group identified organizations that would be
viewed as stakeholders in public forest land management. In
assessing who should participate, the core group considered
institutions that needed to be represented to ensure the
support for any strategy that the partnership developed.
Stakeholders were brought to the table if they had technical
expertise or veto power in other arenas. Founders asked
these groups to designate representatives to sit on a board.
In contrast to the Applegate Partnership’s emphasis on
recruiting participants that could be representative of the
core views and issues of their constituencies, the Grand
Canyon Forest Partnership sought participants to repre-
sent their organizations in drafting and endorsing specific
proposals.
Common Challenges, Contrasting
Responses _____________________
The founding process of each of these two groups and
institutional character of their settings shaped how the
partnerships formed. With differing local contexts, founding
dynamics, and perceptions of the central problem (and
associated response), these two partnerships developed
markedly different organizational forms and habits. To
contrast these differences, we identify three major chal-
lenges common to both partnerships and contrast their
responses to these challenges.
Balancing Participation and
Decisionmaking Authority
The relationships of the people who actively participate
and nonactivists who have some interest in the work of a
partnership are important because everyone cannot be at
the table at once. Active participants are only a small
fraction of the people who have a stake in the work of a
partnership. Yet, active participants make management
decisions for the larger society. To succeed a partnership
needs social “permission” to do their work. How did the
participants represent the larger society and what effect did
it have on the form and possibilities of these groups? There
are, really, three ways that people “represent” in these sorts
of groups. Although they are readily distinguished theoreti-
cally, in fact, people practically shift from one mode to the
other.
One way that people come to the table is as representa-
tives of particular groups. For example, in the Grand Can-
yon Forest Partnership, the 17 initial partner organizations
each selected a formal representative that had the authority
to represent his or her institution in any negotiation or
agreement. In this form, the representative tends to be tied
to the institutional concerns of his or her agency. These
concerns could include fulfilling legal mandates, avoiding
political conflict, taking leadership in reform efforts, and
defending turf. The personality, skills, and ideology of the
representative and the freedom that his or her home agency
gives them mediate the extent of the institutionalist mode of
participation of particular participants.
The second form is representation of the interests of a
constituency. In this case, someone comes to the partnership
with constituent interests firmly in mind. For example, a
timber industry lobbyist might come to the table to protect
and promote the industry’s economic interests. Similarly, an
environmentalist may come to the table committed to de-
fending the values and interests of other environmentalists.
We can imagine, in these instances, that these representa-
tives will tend to act self-interestedly on behalf of their
constituents. They may tend to be strategic in their position
taking. In addition, they might be inclined to take extreme
positions and then bargain on behalf of their constituents.
Again, these tendencies will be moderated by the personal-
ity of the representative. Divisions or lack of clear opinions
or positions within the representative’s constituency may
also create flexibility and opportunity for independent
behavior.
A third form of representation is that of perspective. In
this instance, participants are viewed as bringing to the
table their knowledge, experience as someone who has
particular life experiences and values that lend insights to
the conundrums that the group faces. For example, a logger
might bring values about the importance of continuing to
harvest and knowledge and skills about the opportunities
and limits of particular harvest plans, and the views of her
peer group. An agency scientist might bring values of species
protection and information about ecosystem dynamics in the
region under discussion, and an understanding of his agency's
organizational limitations.
The Grand Canyon Forest Partnership viewed represen-
tation primarily in the first two ways. The Applegate sought
to create the third form of representation but the first two
forms were important at particular times as well.
At its outset, the founders of the Grand Canyon Forest
Partnership believed that the solution to public skepticism
over public forest management was to establish a partner-
ship of respected organizations and institutions that con-
stituted a diverse set of positions and views on forest
management. If this group of powerful institutions could
then reach consensus, public support would follow.
With their focus on influential organizations, institu-
tional representation dominated the Grand Canyon Forest
Partnership. By and large, participants represented the
agencies and organizations from which they came. Founders
assumed that the people at the table represented the key
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views of major constituencies and all the important perspec-
tives on forest management.
In contrast to the Grand Canyon group’s emphasis on
institutional representation, the Applegate Partnership
encouraged its participants to represent perspectives rather
than institutional positions. In this way, the group believed
the key to innovation was bringing people and ideas together
in new ways. Participants talked about “leaving positions at
the door and bringing only values and interests.” This
approach was also reflected in the group’s culture of negotia-
tion. Rather than supporting a process in which representa-
tives started negotiating from extreme positions and then
negotiated towards the middle, the group tried to focus on
problem solving and collectively identifying alternatives.
However, despite this explicit focus on perspective over
positions, all three forms of representation existed in the
Applegate, and individuals would shift from one form of
representation to another as circumstances and mood
dictated.
Group Structure and Participant Authority
The second challenge facing both collaboratives was how
to structure the roles of participants. The Grand Canyon
group quickly sought to formalize and institutionalize the
partnership structure but the Applegate Partnership re-
sisted formalization.
In the institutionally rich environment of northern Ari-
zona, the member organizations of the Grand Canyon Forest
Partnership, the majority of whom are public or quasi-public
institutions, sought to establish a clear organizational struc-
ture and legal body capable of managing the coordination
process. The Grand Canyon group created a new not-for-
profit organization to assume the responsibility for the
forest management projects. It hired a staff person who met
weekly with a management team composed of representa-
tives of five of the 15 partners to handle the day-to-day
decisionmaking.
The full partnership met monthly to review partnership
priorities and progress in the implementation. The group
gave informal responsibility for meeting facilitating to the
representative of one of the most active partnership groups.
The meetings were open to the public and a number of
interest group representatives and other agency personnel
frequently attended. However, formal decisionmaking au-
thority rested only with the designated partner groups. The
group’s bylaws stipulated the necessity of consensus among
a majority of participating partners. Voice votes were typi-
cally used to make decisions on priorities.
In contrast, the Applegate Partnership actively resisted
formalizing an implementing body separate from the col-
laborative for its first 4 years. It sought to avoid the emer-
gence of separate organizational structures. In its first
years, governmental and nongovernmental participants ac-
complished the majority of the Applegate Partnership’s
work. These groups were responsible for identifying the
resources necessary to provide support for the partnership’s
projects and functions.
Eventually the Applegate Partnership did establish a not-
for-profit entity and a watershed council that acted as
subsidiaries to the larger partnership. These entities be-
came an important part of the Applegate Valley’s capacity to
implement a wide range of planning and restoration projects.
However, the long period of distributive leadership had
created a culture of decentralized decisionmaking and
responsibility.
Also reflecting this caution against consolidating leader-
ship, the facilitation of the Applegate’s meetings constantly
rotated. This informal culture of rotating leadership
has helped the group avoid the perception that any par-
ticular person has a disproportionate influence on group
decisionmaking.
We can see, then, an institution-focused participation and
representation led the Grand Canyon Forest Partnership to
create an early organization and bureaucratic structure for
itself. By contract, the informal, nonorganizational Applegate
Partnership and its notion of perspective-based representa-
tion led to distributed leadership and project implementation.
Communicating with Nonparticipants
The final challenge that both groups faced was developing
systems to communicate with people beyond core partner-
ship activists. Because not everyone can logistically or prac-
tically come to the table, one central task of partnerships is
to communicate with nonparticipants. The Grand Canyon
Forest Partnership followed two distinct strategies for com-
munication. One was with the agencies and close constitu-
ents of participants and the second was with the general
public. By contrast, the Applegate Partnership used similar
communication strategies with close allies and with more
distant ones. As distance from the partnership increased the
intensity of communication diminished.
The communication among Grand Canyon participants
was direct and involved iterative policy development. But
even within the Grand Canyon Partnership, participation in
communication depended on the level of organizational
involvement in the partnership’s activities. A management
team represented five of the most active partnership organi-
zations. This group met weekly to develop the specific
implementation plans. Most of the decisionmaking took
place within this core group of active partner organizations.
The larger group of partners was involved primarily through
the monthly partnership meetings, special meetings, and
electronic correspondence.
When the Grand Canyon group sought to communicate
with people beyond constituent agencies and organizations,
its focus shifted from deliberation and iterative proposal
development to information and education. The group used
a series of public meetings during its initial phases to solicit
public comment on proposed actions. When some of the
public opposed the Grand Canyon’s proposal to limit certain
types of recreation use, the partnership dropped those pro-
posals. Subsequently, the partnership relied almost entirely
on press releases, media coverage, and the formal govern-
ment review processes to announce to the public what they
planned to do and why.
In the Applegate, the distinction between “public” and
“constituent” was less pronounced because participants were
rarely formally representing people but rather were repre-
senting perspectives. Clearly, people working for organiza-
tions and for interest-based constituencies had responsibili-
ties to communicate proposals back to their organizations to
get feedback. But partnership participants knew this
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institutional sign-off would not be sufficient to garner broad
community support. Because people sitting at the table were
often not formal representatives they had no explicit permis-
sion to enter into agreements on anyone’s behalf. Conse-
quently, participants needed an interactive relationship
with a large number of stakeholders beyond the partnership
itself.
At meetings, decisions were often preliminary agree-
ments that participants would take to their social networks
to test out. Subsequently, at or between meetings, on the
phone or in person, participants would bring back reactions
of the various people in participants’ networks and modify
decisions. Of central importance to the Applegate group
were informal social networks. Rarely did the Applegate
Partnership use the media to get their message out. Instead,
participants each turned to their social networks, be these
connections with environmentalists, timber workers, people
in the Regional Office of the Forest Service, or community
residents that one saw at other community meetings or
social events. Some connections were professional, others
were social. Some ties were based on strong ties of friend-
ship, others were associational ties from repeated meetings
on natural resource or community business (Granovetter
1973).
Rarely was the primary task of the Applegate Partnership
educational. Because the Applegate group did not represent
people formally, much of their communication was about
gaining permission from the larger community and relevant
organizations to move forward with their ideas. As partner-
ship participants talked to people, they were looking for
feedback, suggested modifications, support, and permission
to move forward. With their social change agenda, commu-
nication was really an “organizing” task, not an information
strategy to explain a decision.
Responses to Challenge
and Conflict ____________________
The socially-based approach of the Applegate Partnership
and the institutional, problem-solving approach of the Grand
Canyon group affected each group’s notions of appropriate
representation, internal structural development, and com-
munication. One can most clearly see effects of these differ-
ences in their responses to external opposition and conflict.
Often partnership groups spend months or years developing
a delicate balance of views, positions, and actions. Once
under pressure, these agreements can become unstable and
stretch the collaboration to its limits.
Going Public, Building Expectations
For both the partnerships, the founding periods were
spent largely out of public view. This period involved dozens
of meetings in which participants tried to find common
ground among diverse interests and agendas. In both groups,
this period ended by “going public” with events in which the
partnerships described the newly found common ground
and celebrated the great potential for common action.
Having raised public expectations, these groups had to
demonstrate the efficacy of their claims. Because both groups
were working largely on public land issues, this necessitated
a federal lands planning process. Because they were federal
land projects, the public had to review the plans. In both
cases, the initial projects were on Forest Service lands. In
each case, local agency officials, both District and Forest
level, worked closely with the partners to develop a project
and then the environmental assessment. Also common to
both cases, developing the proposed action was lengthy, and
diverse interests, particularly environmental and industry,
conflicted frequently. At various points in both partner-
ships, negotiations nearly broke off and threatened the
continued existence of the partnerships. In the Grand Can-
yon Forest Partnership, some of these negotiations in-
volved groups that were not formally partners but were
capable of obstructing the process if not satisfied. Ulti-
mately, in both efforts, participants made compromises to
craft an action all of the major interests would support,
usually by reducing the scope and intensity of proposed
actions.
Once these concessions were made, most members of each
partnership believed that they had appeased the important
stakeholders. Both groups recognized that there were out-
lier groups that had not been satisfied but dismissed their
power to obstruct the process because of the agreement
among participants and apparent public support.
In both cases, environmental groups that had not actively
participated in project formation, and opposed the concept of
collaborative management more generally, sought to stop
these first projects through the administrative appeals pro-
cess. In both cases, an environmental organization pursued
administrative appeals using the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) that led the Regional Offices to require
that the respective National Forests (Rogue River National
Forest in southern Oregon, Coconino National Forest of
northern Arizona) modify the environmental assessments
to meet the demands of appellants. In the case of the Grand
Canyon project, some environmentalists remained unsatis-
fied and pursued legal settlement in the courts.
Contrasting Responses
These successful appeals tremendously impacted the
morale and internal cohesion of both partnerships. The
tenuous and often strained accommodations these unlikely
partners had created now began to fray. Internal dissension
over strategy began to grow. It is at this point that the real
differences between these two partnerships begin to become
more apparent.
The Applegate Partnership—As the older of the two
partnership groups, more time and history are available to
consider the effects of external opposition on the Applegate’s
orientation. The Applegate’s focus on social change and
informal structure allowed the group to shift substantive
focus temporarily and continue to work on institutional
change and citizen involvement. When the Forest Service
project stalled, the group shifted its attention to the develop-
ment of similar management changes with the Bureau of
Land Management and private landowners.
For the Applegate, the initial challenges created by the
appeal of its premier project were only the beginning of its
tribulations. The success of the appeal of the Applegate
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Partnership’s first project, called Partnership One, sub-
stantially shifted the balance of opinion within the envi-
ronmental community. (It should be noted, however, that
Partnership One was not simply challenged from the envi-
ronmental side. The timber industry also opposed the sale by
not bidding for the timber once the Forest Service gained
approval to proceed.) The lead environmental organization
in the Partnership, Headwaters, eventually bowed to pres-
sure from the rest of the environmental community and
withdrew from the Partnership.
Although the Headwater’s withdrawal was a public blow
for the partnership and emotionally anguishing for many
participants, ironically, it did not substantially change the
makeup of the partnership. Two of the three the individuals
representing Headwaters continued to participate in the
partnership. These were people who were both representa-
tives of Headwaters and residents of the local Applegate
community. When Headwaters withdrew its formal organi-
zational support, these people continued to participate, now
as community residents active in local watershed groups.
As it tried to recover from what many assumed would be
a fatal blow—Headwaters’s departure—the partnership took
yet another major hit. Paradoxically, this time the source of
the damage was the timber industry. In an effort to invali-
date President Clinton’s Northwest Forest Plan, represen-
tatives of regional and national timber organizations sued
the federal government, arguing that the Plan’s creation
violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). Passed
in the early 1970s, Congress designed FACA to reduce the
influence of special interests on federal agency policy mak-
ing, especially defense contractors on Pentagon planning
and decisionmaking. FACA outlined a series of provisions
that federal agencies must follow if it participates in any
joint decisionmaking processes with nonagency groups.
Afraid that it might jeopardize the huge investments it
had made in the development of the Northwest Forest Plan,
the Clinton Administration ordered all public agencies to
withdraw from partnerships or other collaborative efforts
that might violate FACA. Agency officials who had been
formal partners in the Applegate process could no longer be
Applegate Partnership board members. Despite their
pledges to continue to participate as nondecisionmaking
members, the basic foundation on which that the partner-
ship had been built was now shattered. In the span of just
6 months, the Applegate Partnership lost two of its organi-
zational constituents.
Facing these difficult events, the Applegate Partnership
went through an important internal reevaluation and meta-
morphosis. Throughout its early period, the Applegate had
attempted to balance two sometimes-opposing roles. The
Applegate group viewed itself as an effort to make peace
between two opposing forces and the federal agencies caught
in the crossfire. Much of its early notoriety and influence was
derived from the perception that it was a model for resolving
otherwise intractable conflict in federal land management.
At the same time, the partnership was, from its outset, a
solidly community-based, community-driven initiative. It
was as likely to have a potluck as a conference. Its weekly
meetings were designed to be accessible to community people.
Meeting participation was open to all and locals frequently
outnumbered their agency and interest group counterparts
who were paid to attend.
With its first major project stalled indefinitely and two of
is major power brokers formally withdrawn from the leader-
ship of the group, the Applegate reconsidered its focus and
constituency. It broadened its focus to include a wider range
of community issues. Aware that community support was
now essential, the Applegate initiated a major community
outreach and assessment process to identify the range of
community concerns and ideas. From this and other forms of
informal outreach, partnership activists launched a broad
set of local initiatives. For example, one subset of partici-
pants was interested in private land restoration that would
improve wild salmon fisheries.
At the same time, the partnership began working more
actively with the BLM to evaluate restoration projects on its
land. Over time, with considerable perseverance, the part-
nership developed ways to work with the federal agencies
that did not involve formal joint decisionmaking. Within
6 months, the struggles over its first Forest Service project
and the consequences of FACA were largely forgotten as a
broader set of activities began to occupy the partnership’s
attention.
Three years after its founding, the consequences of this
shift from interest-based partnership to community-based
partnership could be clearly seen in the projects and accom-
plishments for which the partnership was either directly or
indirectly responsible. Beyond shifting of BLM manage-
ment in one resource area and private land restoration
projects, the Applegate Partnership began to publish a
bimonthly newspaper distributed to all 10,000 residences in
the watershed. It spun off a small-scale economic develop-
ment group looking at land-oriented small enterprise oppor-
tunities. Later, the partnership brokered a deal with one
county to have the community develop a management plan
and land use regulations related to gravel extraction. Part-
nership participants helped bring a county park under
community management after the county shut it down
because of a lack of funding. Repeatedly the Applegate
Partnership took on the task of mediating conflict and
brokering agreements between community residents and
government agencies, be they federal, state, or county. At
every turn, partnership activists argued for different pro-
cesses that included community residents earlier in plan-
ning processes, bringing together conflicting parties to find
common ground.
As we see, then, when faced with blockages such as the
administrative appeal of the Partnership One project and
then FACA, Applegate Partnership participants did not give
up. Rather, they fell back on their larger goals of social
change and ecosystem management in the watershed. These
broad goals allowed the group to conceive a wide variety of
particular projects to achieve their ends. This broadening
was possible because, from the beginning, a substantial
proportion of its active participants saw themselves as
community residents first and organizational representa-
tives second.
The Grand Canyon Forest Partnership—When faced
with opposition the Applegate Partnership broadened its
variety of strategies and shifted its attention from stalled to
viable projects. In contrast, the Grand Canyon group’s nar-
row problem definition limited its room for maneuver when
confronted by effective opposition.
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Founded in the summer of 1996, when fires burned over
40,000 acres of northern Arizona forests, the Grand Canyon
Forest Partnership’s proposals to develop restoration and
wildfire reduction programs had enjoyed wide public sup-
port. After 2 years of working out its proposal internally, the
partnership held a series of public meetings to communicate
its proposal to the public. The partnership outlined thin-
ning, prescribed fire, and also a series of recreation manage-
ment proposals, including the closure of some popular trails
and remote roads.
To the surprise of many organizers, the public seemed to
broadly support extensive forest thinning and prescribed
fire. People could not yet visualize the posttreatment ap-
pearance of the restored areas, but were supportive of
reducing the potential for wildfires that could threaten
human life and property. This bolstered the partnership’s
perception that the community was behind its efforts to
develop a restoration/wildfire hazard reduction strategy.
In contrast, the meeting that focused on recreation use
generated substantial concern and some controversy. Ru-
mors began circulating that the Grand Canyon group was
attempting to exclude one or another recreation user group.
A nascent opposition to the partnership’s efforts began to
organize, creating unlikely alliances between mountain bike
users, ATV enthusiasts, equestrian advocates, and others. It
quickly became apparent that recreation issues could be-
come a flash point for opposition to the overall restoration
initiative.
In response, the group decided to narrow its focus and
exclude the controversial elements of the recreation plan
from the proposed action. The group discussed the possibil-
ity of developing a restoration task group to convene a
collaborative process with recreation interests. After a se-
ries of tentative steps in this direction, the effort was
dropped and Grand Canyon participants focused on develop-
ing and implementing the thinning and fire treatments.
Confident that it now had a broad public mandate to
proceed, the Grand Canyon Forest Partnership and the
Forest Service drafted the environmental assessment and
prepared for formal public review. However, throughout the
preparation of the final proposal, the partnership experi-
enced agonizing disagreements with prominent local and
regional environmentalists over a variety of provisions. For
example, the Forest Service began a series of test plots using
a range of treatments. The graphic reality of the actual
treatment impacts nearly destroyed the fragile agreements
that had been crafted with these environmental groups. Yet
despite these setbacks, partnership leaders continued to
make concessions and deferrals that maintained the truce
and allowed the project to proceed. Having conceded to most
of the demands made by these groups, the partnership and
the Forest Service were confident its proposed action would
withstand any outside challenges.
It was no surprise when an environmental group from
outside the area filed an appeal. But the partnership was
shocked when the Regional Office of the Forest Service
upheld the appeal. A group that most had dismissed as an
irrelevant outsider was now a champion trumpeting its vic-
tory around the country. A partnership regarded as a national
model for transcending the gridlock of federal forest man-
agement found itself buried in political mud.
The defeat created a period of internal disorder within the
partnership. The timelines that had been established for
implementing treatments were now irrelevant. Efforts to
develop markets for the restoration byproducts, a step es-
sential to making the restoration treatments economically
viable, were destroyed as entrepreneurs canceled plans to
invest in new tools and technology. Other financial re-
sources the partnership was pursuing also evaporated as
word spread that the partnership was stalled.
These setbacks further aggravated nascent tensions within
the partnership over strategy and priorities. One faction
advocated for the partnership taking a leading role in re-
gional and national dialogues on the underlying issues of the
opponents of cross-interest collaborations. Others favored
abandoning the conciliatory approach in favor of aggressive
counterattack using legal challenges and high profile efforts
to question the credibility of opposing groups.
In response to these challenges, the partnership chose
again to narrow its focus. The primary focus of project
development shifted to fire hazard reduction projects in
proximity to human developments. At the same time, efforts
to secure final approval for the partnership’s first stalled
project began to focus on preparations for a direct legal battle
with project opponents. As the local agency officials made
the mandated changes to the document that the Forest
Service’s Regional Office had ordered, leading groups in the
partnership began formulating a legal strategy for interven-
ing in the event of a lawsuit.
Conclusion_____________________
Faced with complex and difficult natural resource man-
agement challenges, institutions and communities are in-
creasingly looking to multistakeholder collaborations as an
approach to developing widely supported solutions. These
collaborations face many similar challenges: how to inte-
grate diverse interests and issues, how to share
decisionmaking authority, and how to organize resources
and expertise necessary to develop solutions.
The prevailing perception within these groups about the
nature of the problem they face and how it can be most
effectively addressed largely shaped the choices these groups
made in addressing these common challenges. With two ex-
amples, we suggested that the perception of the problem can
shape the strategy and conduct of the resulting collaborations.
Given the central importance of this initial perception of
the problem, we have gone further to try and explain why
two partnership facing relatively similar circumstances
developed different perceptions of the problem and strate-
gies for addressing it. We have asserted that the institu-
tional context in which a partnership takes place determines
much of this initial orientation. In settings rich with pre-
existing institutions—Federal agencies, local governments,
and nongovernmental organizations—it appears that col-
laborations are more likely to have a technocratic problem
solving orientation. Circumstances without this density of
institutions leave more of the influence over the character of
the collaboration in the hands of the private citizens who
create the impetus for formation.
Given the prior history and experience in social change
work—environmental, labor, and peace activism—among
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many of its founding organizers, it is perhaps predictable
that the Applegate initiative viewed its challenge as less a
technical problem and more of a social issue. As a conse-
quence, the strategies it selected and the ways it adapted to
changes and challenges are markedly different than those of
the Grand Canyon Forest Partnership.
Our intention in this paper is not to make explicit or
implicit judgments of the value or effectiveness of one
strategy over another. Few collaborative efforts have existed
long enough to reasonably evaluate their performance
history. In drawing distinctions between these two part-
nerships our intention has been to underscore the forma-
tive influences that shape the evolution and activities of a
partnership. In so doing we hope to contribute to the set
distinctions that will enable both practitioners and re-
searchers to more clearly understand the similarities and
differences between initiatives.
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